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Trespassing the Threshold of Relevance: Media Exposure 
and Opinion Polls of the Sweden Democrats, 2006-2010 
 
In September 2010 the anti-immigration party, the Sweden Democrats (SD), crossed the 
electoral threshold to the Swedish parliament (Riksdagen) for the first time with 5.7 percent of 
the total votes. The aim of this article is to analyze the effect of the media exposure on 
fluctuations in opinion polls for political parties; i.e. the media effect. In particular to what 
extent this can explain the electoral fortunes of the SD. We correlate the number of articles 
published in the print media with the results of the SD opinion polls as well as the opinion poll 
results of all the other parliamentary parties during a 48 month period, from the month after 
the 2006 elections (October 2006) up to September 2010. Our results show that the media 
effect is more important for the SD compared to the other parliamentary parties, similar in 
size. The media effect also differs between the six newspapers put into scrutiny in this study, 
the leading daily Dagens Nyheter (DN) had a considerably stronger effect on the opinion 
fluctuations, compared to the other five newspapers. To conclude, media exposure 
sometimes matters, especially for ‘new parties’, but neither to the same degree everywhere 
nor at the same time. Ultimately, our findings show that the threshold of relevance does not 
perfectly match with the crossing of the electoral threshold to the national parliament, as 
suggested in the literature to explain the electoral fortunes of new anti-immigration parties 
prior to their entry into parliament. 
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Since the second halve of the 19
th century the immigration to Sweden has been substantial.
i In 
2010 the Swedish immigrant population consists of approximately 14 percent foreign born 
individuals and another four percent with two parents born abroad. Politically, immigration to 
Sweden was in the 1950s and 1960s a means to neutralize labour shortage in the industrial 
sector. The following decades, 1970s, 1980s and the 1990s, with increased need for assistance 
to the world refugee situation, Sweden was among the industrial countries with the highest per 
capita intake of refugees. In addition, Sweden has one of the most liberal family reunion 
policies. Recapitulating the integration diachronically, the adaption of immigrants and their 
descendants, in particular economically, have been positive during the first decades after the 
Second World War, but decreased gradually since the 1970s. This weakening integration, 
especially into the labour market, but also into other segments of society, has been a great 
puzzle over the last decades.   
 
For  many  European  countries  a  similar  development  can  be  observed,  but  the  political 
reactions to this situation, has been quite different and prompted scholars to explain why in 
some  countries  anti-immigrant  opinions  thrive,  and  not  in  others  (see  e.g.  Mudde  2007; 
Ivarsflaten 2008). In countries such as Denmark (Hervik 2011) or the Netherlands (Koopmans 
et al. 2005), the mobilization against immigration (especially from countries perceived as 
culturally  remote)  and  the  resistance  towards  multiculturalism  impinges  on  governmental 
politics.  Sweden,  on  the  other  hand,  is  structured  along  a  partisan  consensus  on  the 
immigration issue with the exception of the most recent parliamentary party, the Sweden 
Democrats (SD). The SD wishes to limit immigration to Sweden, a cut up to 90 percent of 
current flows according to a recent budget proposal (Sverigedemokraterna 2010). The other 3 
 
seven parliamentary parties, who managed to cross the electoral threshold of four percent in 
the 2010 elections, unanimously, reject the strong immigration-skeptic stance of the SD.   
 
AIM OF THE STUDY 
This article devotes full attention to the correlation between the media exposure and opinion 
poll fluctuations during the period that preceded the national elections in 2010, i.e. 2006-
2010, assessing the entry of a so-called Populist Radical Right Party (RPP)
ii in the Swedish 
parliament. Sweden was before the 2010 elections referred to as an exemption in Western 
Europe, elsewhere the RPP parties already had made headway. Following Ellinas (20 10, 3) 
we assume the media to ‗control the gateway to the electoral market‘. Without publicity, 
negative or positive, it is not possible for a new political party outside the parliament to gain 
enough votes to secure seats in the assembly. The aim of this article is to analyze the effect of 
media exposure on fluctuations in opinion polls for political parties; i.e. the media effect. In 
particular  to  what  extent  this  could  explain  the  SD  entry  into  the  national  parliament 
(Riksdagen).  More  precise,  we  hypothesize  that  there  is  a  selective  media  effect,  i.e.  the 
degree of media exposure affects the opinion poll fluctuations for the SD, but not for the other 
Swedish political parties represented in the parliament in the period between the national 
elections 2006 and 2010. Second, we hypothesize that the media exposure in the region of 
Skåne, where the SD already was an established party in 2006, has less effect on the SD 
opinion poll in this period.   
 
SWEDEN BELONGS TO THE SWEDES 
The scholarly interest in the SD outside Sweden has only recently gained speed. Before the 
2010 elections, Sweden was typically referred to as an exception in Europe and also in more 
recent literature, such as Ellinas (2010), the SD is referred to as ‗a small Far Rightist group‘ 4 
 
(10-11). Although Swedish journalists wrote extensively on the SD after its initial relative 
breakthrough in the 2006 elections, the international interest has hitherto been quite modest 
and  mainly  devoted  to  explain  the  relative  failure  of  the  SD  to  bring  about  a  negative 
politization of the immigration issue (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008; Rydgren 2010; 
Art 2011).   
 
The SD slogan before the 2010 elections read: ‗Give us Sweden back‘ (Sverigedemokraterna 
2010). They long back to a more homogenous Sweden [the heartland] before what they refer 
to as the ‗mass immigration‘ gained hold.
iii This emphasis on Sweden as the heartland - now 
threatened by foreign ideas and foreign people causing societal ruptures, therefore in need of 
protection - shaped the SD party programs from the start in the late 1980s up to now.  
 
The SD has developed from a loud organization of angry young men with clear Neo-Nazi 
tinges  (with e.g. tentacles  to  the extreme right  movement  White  Arian Resistance) to  try 
becoming a party for the prudent ordinary worker, attracting voters from all the other parties - 
including  those  who  abstain  from  voting  (Holmberg  2007;  Sannerstedt  2008).  During  its 
history,  extremist  views  have  been  abandoned  (such  as  the  death  penalty  and  resistance 
towards extra-European adoptions) and extremist party members, occasionally, being kicked 
out.  The  SD  now  says  to  represent  the  common  man,  to  advocate  a  much  more  limited 
immigration policy (in their view, the Swedish immigration policy is extreme and they say to 
share the only responsible alternative in line with the Danish policy) and tougher policies 
regarding integration. The SD defers any integration measures, to be substituted by various 
assimilation strategies; i.e. all are welcome to become Swedes, but all the non-natives also 
must become ‗Swedes‘. 
 5 
 
The  SD  refers  to  the  days  of  the  Social  Democratic  Sweden  under  Prime  Minister  Tage 
Erlander;  this  was  the  People‘s  Home  at  its  best  and  the  heartland  they  wish  to  restore 
(Hellström and Nilsson 2010). This is according to SD perceptions, yet also a view held by 
other voters who today might be troubled by the relative deterioration of the welfare-state and 
the global competition on the labour market. According to the SD, current labour immigration 
should be curtailed to very few people, with skills not available within the borders of the 
country (Sverigedemokraterna 2010).  
 
The SD does not presuppose certain ethnic groups or cultures to hold superior or inferior 
qualities compared with others, yet they maintain that the difference between Swedes and the 
non-Swedes is impermeable and thus incommensurable. In this view - referred to as ethno-
pluralism (Rydgren 2007), nativism (Mudde 2007) or cultural racism (Taguieff 1990) - all 
people share particular loyalties to their respective country of origin.  
 
NEW PARTIES AND NEW ISSUES 
The SD entry into the national parliament came rather late. Scholars try to explain why for 
instance the Danish People‘s Party (DP) managed to consolidate a stable position in Danish 
politics - since 2001 it has acted as a supporting party for the mainstream right government - 
whereas no equivalent party has made such breakthrough in Swedish politics. Green-Pedersen 
and Krogstrup (2008) argue that the different strategic situation of the mainstream right 
parties and the salience of the immigration issue explain the progress of the DP in Denmark, 
and the relative failure of the SD in Sweden. Also the re-alignment process (the shift to the 
socio-cultural cleavage structure dimension) is comparatively more salient in Denmark, 
leaving a confused and ideologically disoriented Danish Social Democratic Party poorly 
equipped to avoid losing working-class votes to the DP. In this regard, Jens Rydgren (2010) 6 
 
shows that countries yet dominated by socio-economic cleavages provide less political 
opportunities for the RPPs to thrive on their anti-immigration and cultural protectionist 
agenda. 
 
Recent research on the RPP parties (Bale et al. 2010; Rydgren 2010) thus suggest increased 
scholarly  attention  to  the  political  competition  of  the  voters  and  the  salience  of  the 
immigration issue, to understand the emergence and further development of the RPP parties, 
rather than a mere focus on the demand for such parties, following e.g. periods of crisis. There 
is e.g. no clear significant correlation between e.g. levels of unemployment, slow economic 
growth or ethnic heterogeneity and the electoral fortunes of the RPP parties (Rydgren 2007). 
For instance, the size of the immigration population does not match well with high levels of 
anti-immigrant sentiments (Sprague-Jones 2010). While the RPP parties certainly attract more 
politically discontent voters than others, this does not help to explain why protest voters turn 
to the RPP parties and not to other system-critical parties.  
 
To  explain  the  RPP  challenge  to  established  party  hierarchies,  then,  scholars  need  to 
emphasize  the  political  opportunity  structures  in  the  electoral  market,  the  argument  goes 
(Rydgren 2007; Norris 2005). First, scholars converge on that new political parties mobilize 
voters  around  new  issues,  not  enough  issued  by  the  mainstream  parties.  Much  post-war 
politics was shaped around the socio-economic cleavage structure - between the left (more 
prone to accept an active welfare state) and the right (more prone to accept more market-
oriented solutions). However, following e.g. the rise of the Green movement (Inglehart 1990), 
the politization of identity politics (Hervik 2011) and the moralization of politics (Mouffe 
2005)  the  socio-cultural  axis  of  political  competition  has  gained  ground.  Ellinas  (2010) 
recognizes  this  ‗socio-cultural  shift‘  in  many  stable  democracies  towards  a  polarization 7 
 
between, on the one hand those embracing the post-material movement and thus inclined to 
pursue a political agenda that rests on cultural pluralism and, on the other hand, those resisting 
such views to instead find preferences for cultural protectionism.  
 
Second,  the  convergence  between  the  established  parties  in  political  space  provides  yet 
another favourable opportunity structure for new competitors  (Rydgren 2007). Peter Mair 
(2004)  points  out  that  the  political  identities  of  the  mainstream  parties  are  increasingly 
blurred. Chantal Mouffe (2005) links the Social Democratic turn to the political centre and the 
abundance of the conflicts along the socio-economic axis to the recent electoral fortunes by 
the RPPs. In her view, the moralization of politics (politics being played out in the moral 
register between good versus evil (rather than solely between right and left) has taken speed 
due  to  this  increased  party  convergence.  This  provides  opportunities  for  new  political 
contesters to occupy the position of a political underdog – protecting the wills and interests of 
the native population, to establish a feasible alternative to the consensual elites.  
 
The overall structure of the political  competition  of the votes constitutes  a third relevant 
opportunity structure; i.e. how the mainstream parties respond to the RPP parties. Bale et al. 
(2010) shows how the Social Democratic Parties, traditionally split between progressive- and 
conservative voters, have responded with rather different approaches to the challenge of the 
RPP parties, to hold its initial ‗generous‘ approach; to defuse the immigration issue; to adopt 
the politics of the RPP parties. Previously, the mainstream parties in Sweden endured with the 
hold-strategy, or alternatively tried to defuse the immigration issue from the political agenda. 
 
Looking  at  our  case  properly,  the  SD  thrives  on  popular  demands  for  a  more  restrictive 
immigration politics, yet it articulates rather mainstream views on socio-economic issues (see 8 
 
e.g. Sannerstedt 2008). To date, the other seven parties are careful not to be associated with 
SD – as the card you least want on your hand in the dynamics of political competition – a 
loosening  up  of  the  moral  distance  towards  SD  risk  credibility  losses  as  the  mainstream 
parties risk being accused of stealing (back) the SD-votes, as a consequence (Saveljeff 2011). 
This  resistance,  Rydgren  (2010)  concludes,  has  motivated  a  strategy  of  cardon  sanitaire 
adapted by the other parties to answer (or rather not answer) to the challenge posed by the SD 
in Swedish politics. 
 
There is thus a strong convergence at the centre around the immigrations issue to defer any 
influence of the SD in national politics, that is to debar the party from the ‗public‘s zone of 
acquiescence‘ (Norris 2005, 21).  However, as envisaged by e.g. Norris (ibid), this zone is not 
static  and  in  turn  what  is  depicted  as  ‗normal‘  talk  on  e.g.  immigration  shifts,  also  in 
mainstream  political  debate.  In  Sweden  some  of  the  mainstream  parties  have  previously 
launched  demands  of  e.g.  language-tests  and  citizenship  courses  as  prerequisites  for 
naturalization,  in  addition,  proposals  were  initiated  to  make  possible  the  withdrawal  of 
citizenship for foreign-born individuals (Bevelander et al. 2011). In sum, to remain ‗radical‘ 
and yet remain in the ‗zone of acquiescence‘ the SD exacerbates popular worries about e.g. 
multi-culturalism,  suggesting  further  measures  to  strengthen  the  demands  for  citizenship 
qualification, and to limit the immigration to Sweden.   
 
While the mainstream parties and the mainstream press ultimately rejects the challenge of SD, 
Sweden now faces a new political contender grand enough not to be taken seriously. It is not 
perfectly viable to counter a parliamentary party that enjoys the position of tipping the scales 
in favour of either political bloc with a strategy of silence. So far its influence on the dynamic 
of  political  competition  is  limited  to  the  moralization  of  the  political  language  and  the 9 
 
increased  polarization  around  the  immigration  issue.  Whether  this  will  lead  to  increased 
politization, divisions between the mainstream  parties or even to some issue convergence 
between the SD and other parliamentary parties (adaptation) – what has been the case in most 
other European countries (Bale et al. 2010), it is too close to call.   
 
In this brief overview of some frequently adopted explanations of the electoral gains of the 
RPPs, we have e.g. discussed theories that emphasize the politization of new issues and the 
re-alignment processes from socio-economic issues to the socio-cultural cleavage dimension; 
the degree of convergence between the mainstream parties in the political space; the need to 
consider the strategies adopted by the mainstream parties to respond to the RPP-parties and 
the overall structure of the political competition. 
 
Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008) claim that the media plays  a less dominant role to 
explain why e.g. the ‗immigration issue‘ is politicized and made into a salient political issue 
in the political competition of the votes. This might be correct, not least in the Danish case, 
however to explain the SD entry into the Swedish national parliament 2010 there is reason to 
believe that a closer look at the media effect, especially in the period preceding its electoral 
breakthrough,  is  potentially  enlightening.    In  line  with  Ellinas  (2010,  18)  who  says  that: 
‗Media exposure can push minor parties into mainstream debate, give them visibility, and 
legitimating  their  claims‘,  and  Rydgren  (2005,  255)  who  suggests  that  here  is  a  lack  of 
research devoted to the role of mass media to explaining the RPP parties, our analysis of the 
electoral fortunes of the SD in relation to its media exposure emphasize the media effect in the 
political competition of the votes.  
 
MEDIA EXPOSURE AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR 10 
 
In 2010 Ellinas gave a systematic account of the role of the media and the rise of the ‗Far 
Right‘ in countries such as France, Austria, Greece and Germany. His book has two main 
theses. Firstly, the party positioning on national identity issues structures the opportunities for 
the RPPs to enjoy their initial electoral breakthrough. Secondly, it examines how the media 
exposure granted to the political newcomer (or lack thereof) can explain or possibly hinder 
the  newcomer  to  gain  electoral  fortunes.  His  analysis  offers  a  temporal  dimension  to 
understand not only why certain RPPs make headway, while others fail, but also when.   
 
Ellinas (2010, 15) relies on the Sartorian notion of ‗threshold of relevance‘, which is based on 
the  premise  that:  ‗once  parties  become  electorally  relevant,  their  electoral  fortunes  are 
determined by different factors than before‘. He thus suggests a two-stage approach – before 
and after the initial electoral breakthrough. At the first stage, before the RPP parties have 
grown big enough to play a central role on the electoral market, it is most appropriate to focus 
on the reactions of the mainstream parties whether they i.e. choose to ignore, confront or 
adjust themselves to the political newcomer. Once the party has crossed the threshold of 
relevance, though, it is likely to moderate its claims to address a broader audience and the 
mainstream  parties find it more difficult  to  ignore these  claims. At  this  latter stage, it is 
increasingly  more  important  to  focus  on  the  internal  party  arena,  i.e.  the  organizational 
capacity of the new parliamentary party whereas the tactical maneuvering of the political 
competitors subsides in importance.  
 
Faced with internal ruptures and a lack of solid organizational base, the party is a likely 
candidate to become a ‗flash phenomenon‘ (see e.g. Taggart 2002), and thus abruptly suffer 
from heavy drops in their electoral support. Many of these parties mobilize voters around an 
anti-establishment agenda that help them to cross the initial electoral threshold. Once in the 11 
 
parliament it is difficult to maintain with this underdog position as they, in fact, are parts of 
the establishment. In turn, at this stage, the role of the media subsides in importance.  
 
The ‗threshold of relevance‘, in our view, does not perfectly match with the crossing of the 
electoral threshold to the national parliament, though. We therefore suggest an extension of 
Ellinas  approach, introducing  three phases  of development  that better  match the Swedish 
experiences. In 2006, SD failed to gain enough votes (2, 93 per cent) to cross the electoral 
threshold to the national parliament. However at the same time, SD gained seats in half of the 
country‘s local governments, most obvious in the southern regions. Furthermore, its limited 
success at the local elections in 2006 generated a great deal of attention also at the national 
level, which did not correspond well with its, relatively, low strength at the polls (Hellström 
2010). David Art (2011, 11- footnote 7) presents a similar argument with references to e.g. the 
Front National, defining the breakthrough of a new party when it receives enough votes to 
attract  the  attention  of  the  media,  and  forces  the  political  contesters  to  respond  to  its‘ 
activities.  
 
In our case, then, the first stage corresponds to the period before 2006 when the SD had very 
limited media exposure and most commentators disregarded the SD as ‗devils in disguise‘ 
(Hellström and Nilsson 2010). The second stage takes place between 2006 and 2010 when the 
media interest escalated and also the mainstream political parties started to worry about the 
party, to gradually abandon their initial cardon sanitaire strategy to instead engage in debates 
with the SD. The third stage occurs after the 2010 when the party had crossed the electoral 
threshold to the Swedish Riksdag. We thus focus on the media exposure as an explanatory 
factor for the rise of the SD in the national parliament during the second stage; i.e. between 
2006 and 2010.  12 
 
 
MATERIAL, METHOD AND HYPOTHESES 
As earlier mentioned, our aim is to discern the correlation between the opinion poll results, 
conducted  every  month  and  the  magnitude  in  newspaper  articles  by  the  most  important 
newspapers in Sweden. More specific, was the SD opinion poll and election results affected 
by the media attention in the period October 2006 – September 2010?
iv  
 
We do this by the use of two data s ources. On the one side, the opinion polls conducted by 
different opinion poll companies in Sweden over the period October 2006 to August 2010
v 
and, on the other side, the number of newspaper articles published by the six leading 
newspapers which can be traced in the Swedish digital media archive, Mediearkivet (2010).  
 
The monthly opinion poll used in the article is the means of all opinion polls conducted in that 
particular month. For September 2010 we used the actual election outcome. Moreover, we 
created series for all the eight political parties that crosses the electoral threshold in the 2010 
elections, the Social Democrats (S), the Moderaterna (M)
vi, the Sweden Democrats (SD), the 
Christian Democrats (KD), the Greens (MP), the Centre Party (C), the Liberal party (FP) and 
the Left party (V). Apart from the Social Democrats and the Moderaterna, the other parties are 
all relatively small, just above the four per cent parliamentary threshold. We emphasize the 
media exposure for these parties to compare the results of the SD to all other political parties 
and especially those  who share about the same magnitude in potential votes in the period 
2006—2010.  
 
The statistics on the number of newspaper articles written on a particular party are based on 
monthly searches in the Swedish digital media archive by newspaper and political party. We 13 
 
do this by means of key words match (hence, the names of all the political parties represented 
in the parliament after 2010) in the media archive. Our material is based on the six leading 
newspapers  in  Sweden,  given  their  circulation  rate  (Mediefakta  2010).  According  to 
Strömbeck and Aalberg (2008: 95), the Swedish model of media and politics belong to the so-
called  ‗Democratic  Corporativist  Model‘,  which  alludes  to  a  historical  co-existence  of 
commercial and public media, tied to particular social and political groups with a legally 
limited,  though  relatively  active,  role  of  the  state  (ibid,  92).  The  newspapers  in  Sweden, 
traditionally split along the classic left-right continuum, have to a high degree broken their 
formal ties to political parties, leaving a majority of the newspapers to describe themselves as 
‗independently liberal‘.
vii Concerning the SD, all the dominant newspapers share a negative 
view towards the party (Hellström and Hervik 2011), after the national elections 2010 e.g. the 
tabloids Expressen (Exp) and Aftonbladet (AB) launched campaigns against the party, and the 
xenophobic sentiments they, supposedly,  capitalize on. Our sample consists of the two largest 
tabloids (Exp and AB), two Stockholm-centered, yet nationwide newspapers (Dagens Nyheter 
(DN)  and  Svenska  Dagbladet  (SvD)  and  finally  two  regionally  based  newspapers 
(Göteborgsposten  (GP)  in  the  Gothenburg  region  and  Sydsvenskan  (SDS)  in  the  Malmö 
region.  
 
Indeed, the media market faces increased competition and it seems fair to suggest that many 
people now access news material via the internet, read free dailies and use various channels of 
social media to communicate actively or passively receive opinions and news about current 
socio political affairs. 
 
In this regard Jesper Strömbeck, professor in journalism, had elaborated on the role of social 
media in relation to electoral outcome. The main functioning of the social media in partisan 14 
 
politics, he claims, is about mobilization and organizing of party activists to pursue common 
tasks, serving a joint cause. At the same time, the social media has had very limited effect on 
the electoral performance (see e.g. Strömbeck 27 April 2010). In this article we shall put to 
test whether the traditional media still shows an effect on the opinion poll fluctuations. 
 
To ensure reliability, we contacted the responsible editors-in-chief, the political editors and 
news editors of these six newspapers.
viii The respondents were asked to estimate whether they 
had published more, less or the same amount of articles on the SD, relative its size, compared 
to the other political parties. A response given by the editor-in-chief of Exp, Thomas Mattsson 
is symptomatic as he resists guidelines or publishing policies devoted to distinct parties, 
though he hints at the media logic that make priority over the ‗deviant‘ and particular 
interesting phenomena in the total media coverage (interview 20 April 2011). Many of the 
interviewees also remembered much discussion on this issue, especially after that the SD 
increased its support in the polls. According to e.g. the news editor of DN, Anders Olsson 
(interview 9 May 2011; cf. interview with Eva Parkrud 27 April 2011), it is important to 
report meticulously on the SD, not being blue-eyed
ix and yet recognize that the party 
developed in this period to become a  political contender on the verge to the national 
parliament. Accordingly, if the SD is conceived as a particular interesting and/or deviant case 
in Swedish politics, especially after it – according to the opinion polls – grew above the 
electoral threshold, we could perhaps expect more relative weight devoted to the SD in the 
media coverage, compared to the mainstream parties.   
 
Provided the newspapers‘ ambitions not to publish more, or less, articles around particular 
parties, the media effect should remain equally salient for all the parties of similar sizes. 
However, if we pay attention to Ellinas, the media effect rests more salient for parties that are 15 
 
on the verge to cross the threshold of relevance, though not yet being in parliament. The 
special character of the SD, by some of the interviewees described as xenophobic, and its 
gradual boost in the opinion polls motivate us to formulate the first hypothesis:  
 
1.  The degree of  media  exposure is  not  a significant  factor  to  determining the 
electoral fortunes of the already established political parties. Yet there is a selective media 
effect for the SD, reflected in the monthly opinion polls 2006—2010.   
 
In addition, we anticipate a three-step temporal model to explain spatial varieties in the SD 
electoral  performance.  The  degree  of  media  exposure  is  not  equally  important  in  all 
newspapers, but shifts along regional preferences, we assume.  Given this, we argue that the 
SD had already crossed the ‗threshold of relevance‘ in Skåne by 2006, which suggests that the 
correlation between the media exposure of the SD in the regional newspaper SDS already had 
subsided  in  significance  in  the  period  2006-2010.  Our  second  explanatory  hypothesis 
suggests: 
 
2.  The media effect brings less significance for the SD in the regional newspaper 
Sydsvenskan, reflected in the monthly opinion polls 2006—2010.   
 
In the next section we will compare the opinion poll results for the parliamentary parties with 
the magnitude of articles published in the six largest newspapers in Sweden. To establish a 
connection between opinion poll results and the media attention for a particular party, we 
correlate these two data sources in two ways. Firstly, we correlate the first differences of 
opinion poll monthly levels of a political party with the first differences (FD) of the number 
of published articles in the same month. Secondly, we lag these series on the number of 16 
 
published articles with one month to assess whether there is a lag in the effect of the media 
reporting on a particular party and its opinion poll. Using series with first differences, these 
are not affected by either an upward or downward trend, neither in the opinion poll nor in the 
number of articles published in this period. This can be the case especially concerning the 
number of articles published, since the number of monthly articles on the political parties, 
most likely, will increase approaching the elections. Finally, we conduct an ordinary least 




A first look at the data on the six political parties‘ opinion polls shows that only two parties 
are close to the electoral threshold in the period, namely the KD and the SD (figure 1). Four 
parties reach polls between four and eight percent, while the two major parties scored more 
than 20 per cent. One party, the Green party seems to do somewhat better in the polls than the 
other  parties  in  the  last  year  before  the  actual  election.  However,  this  did  not  clearly 
materialize in the election results as the Greens scored 7.3 of the votes in September 2010, 




Table 1 shows the number of newspaper articles published by the six largest newspapers in 
Sweden, between 2006 and 2010. It shows that most articles were connected to the two largest 
and leading parties of the electoral block in Sweden, Moderaterna and the Social Democrats. 
The  Green  party  generates  more  media  exposure  than  the  other  smaller  parties.  The  two 17 
 
parties that in the opinion polls circulated close to the electoral threshold, the SD and the KD, 
have about the same number of articles.  
 
The FP and the V occupy the middle ground and attract around 140 articles per month. The 
outlier in this table is the number of articles connected to the C, which is substantially lower 
than for the other parties. In this case, though, we should acknowledge limitations as to how 
we search for this party in the archive.
x 
 
As can be seen in table 1, the newspaper  Sydsvenskan is by far the newspaper that publishes 




Our primary focus is on the SD opinion poll development and media exposure over time, 
figure 2 therefore pin-points the opinion poll development of the SD. This figure clearly 
shows an increasing trend over time where both outliers above the trend are connected to two 
specific events in this four year period. The first event relates to an article published by the 
SD party leader Jimmy Åkesson in one of the evening tabloids, Aftonbladet in October 2009. 
In this article, he expresses the view that ‗Muslims‘ are the largest threat to the Swedish 
society. This article was much disputed by the other parties and further voiced in the press, 
however in October 2009 the SD opinion poll elevates, for the first time, above the electoral 
threshold (4, 4 per cent). The article is published on October 19, and the poll increases to 5, 4 
per cent in November 2009. The following months the SD poll gradually drops to its earlier 
level just below the threshold.
xi The second event is the elections, when the SD opinion polls 
foresighted the fortunate position of tipping scales in favour of eeither political bloc.  18 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the number of news articles in the six newspapers for SD in the studied 
period. Also in this figure we observe a weak positive trend towards more newspaper articles, 
including the SD over time. The trend has three peaks. The first one is in October 2006, the 
month  after  the  2006  elections  when  the  SD  gained  several  seats  in  a  number  of 
municipalities. The second peak is in October 2009, the month in which Jimmy Åkesson 
published the above referred article in Aftonbladet. The third peak is in August/September 
2010  in  connection  to  the  elections.  Many  articles  in  this  latest  peak  concerned  the  SD 
promotion film that first was released, but then abandoned from television broadcasting due to 
its provocative imaginary directed at Islam. At the time when the election film was prohibited, 
millions of people could yet follow the uncensored version on You Tube.
xii Moreover, the 
number of articles dedicated to all the parties, rather dramatically, increases in the last month 
before the elections.      
 
[Fig. 2 and 3 ] 
 
Summarizing the descriptive results, the SD opinion poll and the number of articles seem to 
be connected towards a positive trend. Moreover, at two occasions both the opinion poll and 
the number of articles published peaked at the same time in the studied period. The newspaper 
SDS based in Malmö in Southern Sweden publishes most extensively on the SD compared to 
the other newspapers. In the following section we study, more sophisticated, the connection 
between the SD opinion poll and the number of articles written on the SD, correlating the first 
differences from the SD trend. Moreover, by studying the other parties that are close to the 
election threshold and the number of articles published on these parties, we try to establish a 




Table 2 shows the correlation results between the two variables, opinion polls and published 
newspaper articles connected to the different parties for all newspapers together, and each 
newspaper separately. Very few correlation coefficients are positive and significant. However, 
both the strongest correlations and number of significant correlations are measured, for the 
SD. In particular, articles that were published in the month earlier are stronger correlated to 




Table  2  shows  the  correlation  coefficients  between  the  SD  opinion  poll  and  the  six 
newspapers.  The  correlations  with  the  two  leading  national  newspaper  DN  and  SvD  are 
positive and significant (0.29 and 0.50). Also for the national evening tabloid Exp, we find 
positive and significant correlations with the variable published newspaper articles on the SD 
and the lagged variant of this variable (0.34 and 0.39 respectively). The third newspaper that 
shows only one substantial correlation between published articles on the SD and the opinion 
poll in the studied period is the regional newspaper SDS (0.42). The two newspapers AB and 
GP have positive but insignificant correlations with the variable published news articles on 
the  SD  with  the  trend.  Finally,  the  newspaper  SDS  had  just  one  positive  and  significant 
correlation coefficient. This positive correlation is with the de-trended and lagged series of 
published newspapers on the SD (0.45).  
 
If we scrutinize the tables for the other small parliamentary parties in Swedish, and their 
correlation  coefficients  with  the  number  of  published  articles  in  the  studied  period,  we 
observe very few positive and significant correlation coefficients. For the Green party we 20 
 
observe a negative and significant correlation of the opinion poll and articles published in the 
evening tabloid AB. The Center party poll is positive correlated with articles in SDS. For the 
two large parties no significant correlations between opinion poll measures and published 
articles can be observed. 
 
The  correlations  of  the  SD  public  opinion  polls  and  the  other  parties  with  the  published 
articles in the largest and most important newspapers in Sweden over the years between the 
two elections 2006-2010 differ in both number and in level. The correlations between the SD 
opinion  poll  and  the  relative  media  exposure,  in  three  newspapers,  display  a  number  of 
significant positive correlations. For the other three newspapers at least one correlation is on a 
positive level. For no other party or newspaper we found equally many correlations between 
the opinion polls and the number of articles being published. Besides, only the correlation 
between the SD opinion poll and the number of articles published verged the 0.50 correlation 
levels; i.e. fairly strong levels, were obtained. These results indicate that the SD opinion poll 
has been affected by the media exposure in most major newspapers in Sweden. Other parties‘ 
poll show no such media effect.  
 
In order to assess which newspaper affected the opinion poll to the largest extent and to what 
degree,  we  used  an  ordinary  least  square  regression  technique  to  analyze  the  effect  of 
newspaper articles on the SD opinion poll. In table 3 (columns 1 and 2) the beta coefficients 
for separate regressions for each newspaper and one regression including all newspapers are 
displayed. The separate regressions show that four newspapers, DN, SvD, Exp and SDS have 
an impact on the opinion poll of the SD. The regression for all newspapers and with both 
series, in the same month and lagged one month, show only one positive and significant 
coefficient for DN and one negative and significant coefficient for SDS. The reason why the 
effects for the other newspapers are quite high, though yet insignificant, is due that in this 21 
 
regression  all  series  depend  on  each  other.  However,  it  also  shows  that  DN  is  the  most 
important newspaper in the regression explaining the correlation between the media and the 
SD opinion poll.  In terms of effect on the SD opinion poll, if DN published ten more articles 
on the SD, the opinion poll rose with  0.2 percent  one month later. However,  when  SDS 
published 10 more articles the opinion poll dropped with 0.1 percent in the month when the 




To test if the measured effect in the regressions is due to that both the opinion poll and the 
media exposure increase during the last months before the election, i.e. an electoral campaign 
effect, we run OLS regressions, excluding the last two months; i. e October 2006 – July 2010. 
The results of this analysis are shown in table 3 columns 3 and 4. The results here display 
similar patterns. The coefficient for DN is slightly lower, but it is still significant. This is also 
the case with SvD, Exp and SDS. This test shows that the media exposure and the opinion poll 
for the SD are only marginally affected by the electoral campaign.  
 
DISCUSSION 
In the Swedish national elections 2010 the SD crossed the parliamentary threshold. Certainly, 
a number of factors are relevant in explaining the increasing political support for the SD over 
the period 2006-2010. One of these factors, and our focus in this study, is the media exposure 
in Sweden and to what extent it provides some further knowledge of why the SD made it into 
the national parliament in Sweden by 2010. Emphasizing the explanatory power of the degree 
of visibility in the public debate  - by means of measuring the correlation between media 
exposure and voting poll fluctuations - we contribute with a systematic test of the relevance of 22 
 
the  impact  of  media  exposure,  providing  opportunities  for  the  RPPs  to  capitalize  on  the 
demands for nationalist and immigration-skeptic politics.  
 
Our analysis of the number of articles published in six leading newspapers on the political 
parties in Sweden, and in particular the SD, close to the four percent parliament threshold and 
the opinion poll of these parties in the period 2006-2010, shows no censoring of the SD by the 
mainstream press. The correlations obtained in the number of published articles on the SD and 
the SD opinion polls suggest that the SD managed to benefit from this publicity, good or bad, 
to  receive  sufficient  votes  to  enter  the  parliament.  Both,  the  quantity  of  positive  and 
significant correlations, indicate that the SD was not excluded from publicity in these leading 
Swedish newspapers (cf. Nordstrand & Ljunggren 2010). This in turn affected its opinion 
poll, especially in the following month. 
 
RETURNING TO THE HYPOTHESES 
The few correlations between the opinion polls of the other parties and the number of articles 
published are an indirect indication of the media effect on the SD poll results, and suggest that 
the media effect, in general, was rather limited. Our findings suggest that we need to refine the 
saying that the media matters.  Certainly, it partly does, but not always and not to the same 
degree, not everywhere and not all the time.  Especially for parties outside the parliament, 
returning to Ellinas, it is fundamental to get access to the media space, to get the message 
across to the public. Thus in the phase preceding the electoral breakthrough, referred to as the 
threshold of relevance by Ellinas, the media exposure makes an explanatory factor for the 
entry of new parties in the national parliament.  
 23 
 
The articles published by the leading newspaper for public opinion in Sweden, DN, did have a 
significant effect on the opinion poll of the SD. Ten newspaper articles more on the SD, 
published the month before the opinion poll, and increased the poll for the SD  with  0.2 
percent.  We thereby conclude that the first hypothesis is verified, though it matters which 
newspaper being referred to.  
 
The regional newspaper SDS reported relatively most of all the newspapers on the SD. One 
explanation for this would be that the SD already in the 2006 elections crossed the electoral 
threshold  to  the  regional  parliament  and  almost  all  of  the  municipalities  in  that  region. 
Another and related explanation is that this newspaper had a stronger incentive to publish 
articles on the SD due to its relatively high number of electoral mandates obtained in the 
region in which this newspaper, primarily, is read. An indication of this is the fact that we 
found a negative significant correlation between the number of newspaper articles published 
in this newspaper and the opinion poll of the SD in this period – the SD had to live up to its 
voters expectations, to face the realities of day-to-day politics.   
 
Our  findings  thus  detect  some  regional  deviances  in  the  case  of  the  SD.  The  regional 
newspaper SDS had a negative media effect, conversely e.g. the other regional newspaper GP 
in our material had none. In relation to our second hypothesis, there was indeed no positive 
media effect for the SD in the SDS, however a negative one. Future research will preferably 
inform us about whether the media effect will subside in importance, or perhaps even turn 
negative,  for  all  the  other  five  newspapers  put  into  scrutiny  in  this  study  after  the  2010 




WHY AND WHEN THE RPP PARTIES GAIN ELECTORAL FORTUNES 
In 2006, the SD received a little less than three percent of the overall votes – thus not eligible 
for the Swedish national parliament. Nevertheless, it was enough to be treated as a regular 
political contester by its adversaries. This certainly affects the behavior of the mainstream 
parties in a way that differs from the situation before the 2006 national elections. Our findings 
show  that  the  threshold  of  relevance  does  not  perfectly  match  with  the  crossing  of  the 
electoral threshold to the national parliament. Rather in the case of the SD, the explanatory 
weight of the media effect shifts along regional parameters and different newspapers, in the 
period put into scrutiny in this study. In terms of the relative weight of the other explanatory 
factors common in the literature, these probably also shift along spatial and temporal lines.  
Whereas we have neither tested nor disputed the salience of other supply-side explanatory 
factors for the entry of the RRP-parties in the national parliaments, the media effect has some 
explanatory power in its own right, though rather limited.  
 
During the period 2006-2010, the mainstream parties including the mainstream press acted 
unanimously against the SD and gradually abandoned their initial cardon sanitaire approach. 
We could, tentatively, find supporting evidence for a re-alignment process, from a sole focus 
on the socio-economic cleavage dimension to an increased focus on socio-cultural issues, 
ranging  from  the  Christian  Democrats  leader‘s  outburst  against  the  ―new  radical  elite‖ 
(Dagens Nyheter 17 September 2009), to the mobilization against the SD on the immigration 
issue.  
 
There certainly is an increased convergence at the centre, as all the other parliamentary parties 
mutually, from the left to the right, refuted the SD claims or simply ignored them, though 
internally the other parties continued to quarrel along the classic socio-economic parameters 25 
 
in the political competition of the votes before the 2010 elections. Our findings confirm that 
the SD was given a fair amount of publicity in the leading newspapers, between 2006 and 
2010. They were talked about, and heard of, which confirm the view that without publicity 
there is no access to the electoral market for any new political contester.
xiii  
 
Our  results  might  be  interpreted  as  ‗good  news‘  for  the  traditional  media,  i.e.  the  major 
newspapers. The emergence of the free dailies with large circulation rates and the burst of 
various forms of social media have, certainly, enhanced the competition on the media market. 
However, to some extent it still matters what the larger newspapers (e.g. DN) decide to focus 
on in their daily news coverage and in the opinionated material, which does not necessarily 
imply that it reaches out to a readership normally inclined to vote for an anti-establishment 
party such as the SD. What it does suggest however, we believe, is that other kinds of media 
might follow up on what is written in the larger newspapers to pursue with their own news 
reporting and commenting.  
 
Summarizing, the normal implication from this study does not imply that the mainstream 
press was wrong to publish a fair amount of articles on the SD in the period between the 
national elections. Apparently there is a popular demand for a party such as the SD also in 
Swedish national politics. To completely refute or ignore that demand is neither necessarily 
democratically sound, nor to say that there are no anti-immigrant opinions among the Swedish 
populace as long as we do not speak of them. Future research could preferably devote more 
attention to the mechanisms around such anti-immigration demands, not to take these for 
granted, but conversely, to critically examine their accuracy (in fact, more people in Sweden 
seem prone to, gradually, accept a generous immigration policy and increased diversity in 
view of normative ideals of e.g. democratic inclusion. To address these issues, future research 26 
 
needs to dwell into the content of the media reporting and thus expand beyond the mere 
quantitative media effect.   
 
This invites further elaboration on the issue raised by Ellinas, not explicitly dealt with in this 
article, about the party positioning on national identity issues as structural conditioning of the 
opportunities for the RPPs to enjoy electoral gains, and remain in the national parliament.   
The opportunity structures that the RPPs capitalize on to gain electoral profits, is shaped in 
the  broader  partisan  structure  of  political  competition,  as  Green-Pedersen  and  Krogstrup 
(2008) observed. Our findings imply this to be a significant factor in Sweden after the 2010 
national elections to explain fluctuations on the electoral market, as the media effect might 
subside in importance.  In this regard, after the 2010 national elections, we need to foster 
increased  attention  to  which  explanations  are  given  to  the,  comparatively,  rather  modest 







                                                           
i Two previous versions of this paper were presented. The first at the PIKE-seminar held at 
the Malmö Institute for studies of migration, diversity and welfare (MIM), Malmö University 
in May 2011 and the second at the IMISCOE eighth annual conference in Warsaw, September 
2011. The authors appreciate highly all valuable comments that stemmed from these sessions, 
especially to Didier Ruedin who took the time to address a number of important issues.   
ii In the literature, there are many labels attached to this motley party-family, united in its 
resistance of multi-culturalism and generous policies of immigration. The label RPP, though 
certainly not contested, is frequently used.  
iii Taggart (2002, 67) suggests that populist parties unite in perceptions of ‗the people‘, limited 
to the populace of ‗the heartland‘: ‗The heartland is a construction of an ideal world but, 
unlike utopian conceptions, it is constructed retrospectively – being, in essence, a vision 
derived from the past and projected onto the present‘.  
iv Theoretically we assume that the media exposure of a political party affects the opinion poll 
for that party. However, we are aware of the fact that the causality can go in either direction; 
hence, the analysis is an attempt to establish a correlation. 
v We are grateful to Henrik Oskarsson for granting us access to use the opinion poll data, i.e. 
‗the poll of polls‘.  
vi Conservative – liberal party. 
vii Four newspapers in our material are independently liberal (DN, EXP, GP, SDS). AB is 
Social-Democratic and SVD is conservative-liberal.  
viii In sum, we received seven responses – either in written form or by telephone. In the 
appendix, there is a complete list of the interviewees.   28 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ix Anders Olsson mentions the news reporting on the NyD before the 1991 national elections 
as warning example.   
x The results display certain linguistic complexities; i.e. biases. While there are other parties in 
Europe labeled ‗Social-democratic‘, ‗the Green/s‘, ‗The Christian Democrats‘ or the  
‗People‘s Party‘ – thus our sample also has the risk of incorporating non-Swedish parties in 
the sample, however, this is rarely the case with e.g. the Center party, Moderaterna or the 
Sweden Democrats. The alternative procedure would be to use the party abbreviations – 
however this search technique showed too be even more faulted as e.g. the Center Party 
shared the same abbreviation (C) as the target player in an ordinary ice-hockey team.  
xi Aftonbladet had already one month before (September 17) decided to allow the publication 
of election campaign materials from all the other parties, but the SD. The editor-in-chief, Jan 
Helin refused to be the sender of the SD propaganda, though the editorial policy was to allow 
the SD representatives to publish debate articles in their own names.  
xii In the film, a group of burqa-dressed women chased a native-looking female elder. The 
message was that the state could not afford to spend money on both: multi-culturalism – here 
associated with burqa-dressed women – threatens the Universalist welfare state. While many 
were angered by the film, yet other voters could relate to the dichotomy of multi-culturalism 
versus welfare. The SD here, visually, radicalizes concerns already being voiced by others 
who were anxious about the impact of the growing Muslim population in Sweden.  
xiii This invites further comparative research, to e.g. compare the media effect for any other 
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Source: Own calculations based on poll statistics 2006-2010. 
 
 
Table 1, Number of Newspaper articles written on political parties, October 2006 – September 2010. 
  DN  SvD  Exp  AB  GP  SDS  Total  Articles per month 
Sweden Democrats  810  495  627  479  688  1982  5081  106 
Christian Democrats  1060  766  530  362  833  1239  4790  100 
Green Party  1599  1232  820  546  1438  2225  7860  164 
Centre Party  595  566  310  262  438  600  2771  58 
Liberal Party  1315  1053  661  543  1245  1990  6807  143 
Left Party  1322  1113  637  479  1204  1836  6591  137 
Conservative Party  2098  1881  1473  1053  1609  3137  11251  234 
Social Democrats  3661  2776  1904  1548  3062  4740  17691  369 




















                                                                                                                                                                                     
Figure 2, Opinion polls for Sweden Democrats including trend line, October 2006 – September 2010. 
 





Figure  3,  Number  of  newspaper  articles  for  Sweden  Democrats  including  trend  line,  October  2006  – 
September 2010. 
 














                                                                                                                                                                                     
Table 2, Correlations between opinion polls and published articles, monthly statistics, October 2006 – 
September 2010. 
  SD  Ch. Dem  Greens  Centre  Liberal  Left  Cons.  Soc. Dem     
All articles FD  0.20  0.16  -0.28  -0.20  -0.02  -0.05  -0.20  0.09     
All articles FD lagged  0.51**  0.06  -0.05  -0.07  0.17  -0.15  -0.05  -0.16     
DN FD  0.29*  0.18  -0.21  0.07  -0.03  0.03  -0.26  0.05     
DN FD lagged  0.50**  0.13  -0.19  0.20  0.17  -0.13  -0.05  -0.10     
SvD FD  0.05  0.06  -0.08  0.08  0.11  -0.25  -0.06  -0.08     
SvD FD lagged  0.42**  0.18  -0.07  0.03  0.12  0.12  -0.06  -0.22     
Exp FD  0.34*  -0.01  -0.36*  -0.19  -0.14  0.06  -0.11  -0.01     
Exp FD lagged  0.39*  0.07  0.06  0.03  0.09  -0.04  -0.08  -0.08     
AB FD  0.23  0.00  -0.37**  0.00  -0.11  0.06  -0.16  0.02     
AB FD lagged  0.23  -0.02  0.19  0.02  0.05  -0.10  -0.13  -0.05     
GP FD  0.22  0.28  -0.11  0.05  -0.06  -0.06  -0.18  0.01     
GP FD lagged  0.25  -0.23  -0.09  -0.18  0.25  -0.15  0.03  0.03     
SDS FD  -0.04  0.12  -0.24  0.42**  -0.02  -0.18  -0.22  0.20     
SDS FD lagged  0.45**  0.16  0.02  -0.32  0.10  0.00  -0.01  -0.28     
Source: Poll of polls and Mediearkivet, 2010. 
Significance: * = 0.1, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01  
Table 3, OLS on opinion poll for Sweden Democrats, Two periods: October 2006 – September 2010 and 
October 2006 – July 2010
xiii    
  October 2006-September 2010  October 2006-July 2010 
  By newspaper    All newspapers  By newspaper    All newspapers 
DN FD  .007    .001  .006    .001 
DN FD lagged  .022***    .023**  .019**    .022* 
SvD FD  .008    -0.14  .001    -0.13 
SvD FD lagged  .029**    .013  .019*    .013 
Exp FD  .014*    .013  .009    .013 
Exp FD lagged  .020**    .015  .017**    .015 
AB FD  .013    .016  .001    .016 
AB FD lagged  .015    -.020  .006    -.020 
GP FD  .010    .000  .007    .000 
GP FD lagged  .011    -.003  .002    -.004 
SDS FD  -.003    -.011**  -.007*    -.011** 
SDS FD lagged  .013***    .001  .009**    .002 
Constant      .060      .060 
Adjusted R
2      .37      .37 
Source: Poll of polls and Mediearkivet, 2010. 









                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
APPENDIX 1 
List of respondents 
Respondent  Position  Newspaper  Date of interview 
Avellan, Heidi  Political  editor,  the 
editorial pages  
SDS  27 April 2011 
Jönsson, Martin  Managing editor  SvD  3 May 2011 
Mattsson, Thomas  Editor-in-chief  Exp  20 April 2011 
Melin, Lena  Assistant  editor-in-
chief 
AB  3 May 
Olsson, Anders  News editor  DN  9 May 
Parkrud, Eva  Section  editor 
(political-  and  the 
economical 
department) 
GP  27 April 2011 
Sandström, Daniel  Editor-in Chief   SDS  27 April 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 